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Abstract 
In the last few years, macroeconomic modeling has emphasized the role of credit market frictions in 
magnifying and transmitting nominal and real disturbances and their implication for macro-prudential 
policy design. In this paper, I construct a modest New Keynesian general equilibrium model with active 
banking sector. In this set-up, the financial sector interacts with the real side of the economy via firm 
balance sheet and bank capital conditions and through their impact on investment and production decisions. 
I rely on the financial accelerator mechanism due to Bernanke et al. (1999) and combine it with a bank 
capital channel as demonstrated by Aguiar and Drumond (2007). The resulting model is calibrated from the 
perspective of a low-income economy reflecting the existence of relatively high investment adjustment cost, 
strong fiscal dominance, and underdeveloped financial and capital markets. The main objective of this 
exercise is to see whether the financial accelerator mechanism documented under interest-rate-rule based 
simulations could be replicated under a situation where the central bank uses money growth rule in 
stabilizing the national economy. The findings are broadly consistent with previous studies that 
demonstrated stronger role for credit market imperfections in amplifying and propagating monetary policy 
shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past few years, applied research has attached due emphasis to the explicit role of the financial sector in 
amplifying and propagating disturbances into the real economy. The financial crisis that broke out in 2007 has 
spurred a wide range of investigations into the importance of banking and financial activities in shaping business 
cycle fluctuations. Previously, economic thinking was widely influenced by the Modigliani-Miller (MM) principle 
in which financial structure was irrelevant for both banking and non-banking business funding considerations. As a 
result, it did not matter whether a firm financed its investment opportunities by issuing bonds (debt) or shares 
(equity) and the market valuation of the firm would be deemed independent of its capital structure. 
However, the MM hypothesis rests on numerous suspicious assumptions that are incompatible with empirical 
evidence. Some of those assumptions include absence of distortive taxation, symmetric distribution of information 
among transaction parties, efficient goods and financial markets, and zero bankruptcy costs. Since financial markets 
are perfect, there is no wedge between lending and borrowing rates, and in fact, there is no need for financial 
intermediaries as businesses can directly source their external funds from households. The MM principle, 
therefore, would rule out the monetary policy transmission aspects of bank asset and liability management as well 
as the effects of leverage ratio on business investment choices.  
Theory and empirical regularities show that agency problems such as moral hazard and information 
asymmetry play a huge role in influencing access to credit and, therefore, the balance sheet structure of 
entrepreneurial firms, especially small and micro enterprises (SMEs). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have shown how 
existence of agency problems could generate credit rationing in which among observationally identical applicants 
some are offered credit and others are rejected. Thus applicants who are denied credit would not be able to get 
external funds even if they were willing to accept a higher interest rate than the one prevailing in the market or 
post more collateral than was required of eligible borrowers. Under such circumstances, banks would reconcile the 
supply of available funds with demand for credit not by raising the lending rate or demanding more collateral but 
by restricting the number of borrowers via rationing. Thus, downsized balance sheets reduce the banks‘ capacity to 
offer additional loans and lower debt-to-equity ratio incentivizes banks to minimize the variability of their 
portfolio. If this logic is operational, banks are willing to sacrifice more profits on [potentially] successful loan 
advancements by increasing screening and monitoring of loan applicants (Agur, 2010). 
One important force behind the screening and filtering barriers erected by lenders is that agency problems can 
operate through the size of the borrowing firm.1 Size can affect the capital structure of the firm because of the role 
of scale economies in reducing asymmetric information, degree of risk exposure, the extent of transaction costs, and 
access to market facilities. Smaller firms receive less capital or pay higher rates as it is relatively more expensive for 
them to solve informational problems with their potential creditors. This implies that the effect of size on financing 
structure should be more pronounced among start-ups as new firms are more information-wise dense than their 
established counterparts. Moreover, to the extent that firm size is inversely correlated with risk, bankruptcy costs, 
and market barriers, this would discourage smaller firms from accessing outside financing options. Consequently, 
in light of these frictions and imperfections, the capital structure of firms and financial intermediaries could be 
vastly different from the one predicted by the MM principle. 
Size is particularly relevant in the context of low income countries where small and micro enterprises (SMEs) 
have great potential in terms of employment creation as well as in their contribution to GDP but face significant 
barriers against access to finance.2 The World Bank report on small and micro enterprise financing in Ethiopia 
(World Bank, 2015) confirms this observation. The report shows that in both manufacturing and service sectors, 
job creation is higher among established and older firms than under young businesses, suggesting a lack of 
competitiveness and innovation in the private sector. The retail and service sectors were also more important than 
manufacturing in job creation and employment. Regarding financial constraints, the report indicates small firms 
struggle the most in getting access to credit, smaller and young firms are more likely to be rejected for a loan or a 
line of credit, and that SMEs are discouraged or willingly distance themselves from applying for loans due to 
prohibitive collateral requirements. The report also identifies a ‗missing link‘ in which small firms are 
disproportionately affected compared with micro, medium, and large enterprises.3 
The main objective of this paper is to see whether the financial accelerator mechanism documented under 
interest-rate-rule based simulations could be replicated under a situation where the central bank uses money 
growth rule in stabilizing the national economy. The findings are broadly consistent with previous studies that 
demonstrated stronger role for credit market imperfections in amplifying and propagating monetary policy shocks.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Despite their popularity as the workhorse for monetary policy scenario analysis, standard New Keynesian 
general equilibrium models had devoted insignificant role to financial market frictions in magnifying and driving 
macroeconomic volatility.4 These models replicate business cycle properties only with heavy reliance on extensive 
and persistent shocks whose existence cannot easily be verified and explained (Brázdik et al., 2012). In this paper, 
we introduce explicit roles for both business and financial market rigidities that facilitates the amplification and 
propagation of real and nominal shocks affecting the economy.5 
As noted by Markovic (2006) we can identify between two distinct categories of modeling frameworks 
featuring financial market imperfections. The first category includes bank balance sheet models that emphasize the 
supply side aspects of financial markets such as bank balance sheet status. The second group focuses on corporate 
                                                             
1See Cassar (2004) for more detail on financing issues affecting business start-ups. Additionally, owner characteristics (level of education or experience), asset 
structure or collateral, legal organization (presence or absence of limited liability) and other factors can shape financing structure.  
2For instance, under the five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), the government of  Ethiopia recognized the industrial potential embedded in 
SMEs and it planned to generate more than 3 million jobs between 2010/11 and 2014/15,a goal  which  was realized by more than threefold by the end of July 
2015.  
3According to this report only 1.9 percent of small firms have loan or line of credit while the corresponding figures for micro, medium and large firms are 6, 
20.5, 35.5 percent, respectively.  
4 For instance, influential papers like Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).  do not consider financial frictions at all in their New Keynesian models 
5 See also  Vousinas (2013) on the financial-real economy linkage. 
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or business balance sheet conditions like the financial accelerator mechanism influencing firm net worth. While 
most of the literature has so far concentrated solely on the demand side, we also consider interaction with the 
supply side to account for frictions arising from banking and financial markets. 
On the demand side, Bernanke et al. (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1999) constitute the foundation by 
incorporating information asymmetry in credit markets as a source of agency costs influencing investment-
spending behavior among firms. This link is particularly strong when the economy is stuck below its capacity. In 
recession, for instance, demand shortfall negatively affects revenue and consequently firm profit and equity6 fall 
substantially. The attendant increase in leverage ratio (or decrease in net worth) aggravates the already existent 
agency problem and creditors respond by raising the finance premium on their loans. The higher external financial 
premium reduces the demand for capital investment which, in turn, further undermines the net worth position and 
survivability of the firm.  This self-reinforcing mechanism is known as the ―financial accelerator‖ and illustrates the 
pro-cyclical nature of adverse changes in business net worth and their impact on the ability of firms to access 
external funding opportunities.  
The financial accelerator principle implicitly assumes that producers can get unlimited amount of funding at 
the prevailing lending rate subject to the strength of their balance sheet structures (banks demand no guarantee 
that the loan be repaid in full). In this setting, the external risk premium only affects their capacity to borrow 
without facing the possibility of credit rationing or some other quantitative restrictions imposed by lenders. 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) consider collateral constraints that facilitate the magnification of business cycle 
volatility and persistence as a result of dynamic association between credit prices and quantities. 
In the past, the vast majority of the literature focused its attention on credit market imperfections affecting 
firms while the role of banking was understated or totally ignored. Incorporating the financial sector permits an 
important role for the supply side of the credit market by activating banks‘ liquidity and capital structures, which 
creates a two-way bridge between banking services and the broader non-financial economic activity. Consequently, 
introducing an active banking sector creates a double-agency-cost problem between banks and their shareholders 
on the one hand and between borrowers and creditors on the other.7 Heuvel (2002); Markovic (2006); Aguiar and 
Drumond (2007); Christensen and Dib (2008) and Dib (2010) among others, have rationalized how capital 
sufficiency regulations imply a breakdown of the Modigliani-Miller principle: the bank‘s credit supply policy is a 
function of its capital structure, lending opportunities, and market interest rates. For instance, a sharp fall in bank 
capital—from cancellation of large non-performing loans or other adverse shocks—will force the bank to reduce 
the supply of credit because of regulatory capital requirement or the punitive cost of attracting new capital. A 
similar argument can be deployed regarding the role of insufficient bank liquidity in amplifying tight monetary 
policy measures and other negative shocks affecting the broader economy. 
As emphasized byAguiar and Drumond (2007) the discussion on the importance of bank equity in business 
cycle fluctuations is relevant in view of the implementation of the Basel Capital Accords (the first in 1988/1992, the 
second in 2004, and the third motivated by the 2007 financial crisis and yet to be implemented). This series of 
international standards establishes the basis for a host of central banks and other regulatory authorities to make 
sure that commercial banks have adequate capital to weather individual and aggregate risks stemming from within 
and outside the financial system. By imposing risk and capital measurement and management requirements, such 
standards can influence bank credit offer and investment decisions: if a bank finds itself exposed to large 
outstanding risky loans, it will be required to increase its capital to avoid total collapse, and this should reduce 
lending to the wider economy. 
The cost of bank capital can be an important factor for the smooth operation of credit providers. Markovic 
(2006) identifies three key bank capital channels that cause a variation in the expected return and thus a variation 
in the cost of bank capital: 1) the default risk channel due to the possibility of banks defaulting on their capital. This 
channel is active in equilibrium and its strength is, in turn, a function of firms defaulting on bank loans 2) the 
adjustment cost channel which rests on the existence of information asymmetry between depository 
institutions/banks and their investors/shareholders, and the associated monetary cost necessary to minimize this 
asymmetry. If this channel is real, raising fresh capital is costly, as this would send a bad signal to potential 
investors about the financial conditions of the target bank. As a result, prospective investors would buy bank shares 
only after incurring search costs (costs involved in checking the health of specific banks) 3) the capital/equity loss 
channel works via existing shareholders‘ expectation of future bank losses. During recession, shareholders 
anticipate that in the future there will be a decline in the value of their bank capital. Thus, the higher the expected 
erosion in bank equity, the stronger the capital loss channel will be.  
On the empirical front, there have been numerous studies accentuating the significant role of the financial 
sector in intensifying and propagating the effects of adverse shocks affecting the economy. Fukunaga (2002) built 
upon the Bernanke et al. (1999) framework to develop a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to the 
Japanese economy. The model features a micro-financial contractual problem involving companies/borrowers and 
financial intermediaries/banks. Retailers are included to introduce inertia in the price setting process with the 
objective of providing room for monetary non-neutrality in the short run. Moreover, capital producers and 
government (fiscal and monetary sectors) are included. In this decentralized, rational-expectation-equilibrium-
model economy, three sources of unanticipated shocks are considered: technology (total factor productivity), 
monetary and demand (exogenous fiscal expenditure). The results suggest, among other things, that tight 
monetary policy stance (negative shock) is followed by a decline in corporate investment, net worth, and demand 
for capital as a result of a rise in the external financial risk premium. This fall in investment is much deeper and 
more persistent in the model with financial accelerator than the one without credit market frictions.  
In addition to the net worth channel, demand-side financial imperfections have also been identified to originate 
from collateral constraints. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2010)8 compare the relative significance of the two channels in 
                                                             
6Throughout the discourse, I use net worth, equity and capital interchangably both in the context of bank and business balance sheets. 
7 This agency problem has two dimensions: moral hazard (when one agent--the bank--cannot without cost verify the intention, activity or action of another 
agent--the borrower) and adverse selection (when one agent has access to private information). 
8 They also introduce a banking sector in both versions of frictions even though analyzing the impact of shocks emanating from the banking system is not 
their main objective. 
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an extended medium scale New Keynesian model calibrated to the Polish economy. They compare the collateral 
constraint framework of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) with the external finance premium setup of Carlstrom and 
Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999). They rely on business cycle accounting, moment matching, and impulse 
response analyses to see the qualitative and quantitative performance of the two models. Their results indicate that 
both models with financial frictions add volatility to the baseline New Keynesian framework, with the external 
finance premium showing significantly stronger internal propagation mechanism than its collateral constraint 
counterpart. In terms of business cycle accounting, they find superior performance of the models with financial 
frictions to the baseline specification, with the model under collateral constraint offering moments closely 
resembling those filtered from actual data. 
Recently, there have been growing tendencies to model banking activity as a potential source of economic 
fluctuations. For instance, Meh and Moran (2010) using a general equilibrium framework, show that bank capital 
can be an important channel for the transmission of shocks in view of moral hazard problems between banks and 
investors that provide funds. Other works emphasizing the role of bank balance sheets in intensifying and 
transmitting exogenous shocks include Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Hafstead and Smith (2012) among others. 
Though much of the focus has been on bank equity, there have been efforts to incorporate the importance of 
liquidity under a general equilibrium framework. This might involve assigning roles to interbank markets as in 
Carrera and Vega (2012) or studying the impact of reserve requirements as in Areosa and Coelho (2013). 
The vast majority of studies on financial market imperfections are devoted to advanced industrial economies 
and to some extent to emerging blocks while there appears to be scant interest in low-income countries, especially 
those in Sub-Saharan Africa. One contribution is by Babilla (2014) who uses a mix of calibration and Bayesian 
estimation of a modified small open dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The paper evaluates the effectiveness of bank lending channel in the propagation 
of monetary policy measures within a currency union where financial intermediation is dominated by oligopolistic 
banks. Consistent with the evidence for advanced and emerging countries, the paper finds that including financial 
market distortions improves the performance of the model.  
This paper relates to the works of Markovic (2006); Aguiar and Drumond (2007); Christensen and Dib (2008) 
by allowing interaction between the balance sheet structures of the corporate and banking sectors. The Bernanke et 
al. (1999) model of financial accelerator mechanism is augmented to accommodate distortions arising from credit 
suppliers. This way, a double-agency-cost problem is emphasized to capture the effects of information and moral 
hazard costs between banks and borrowers on one side and between banks and their shareholders on the other. It is 
assumed that banks mobilize funding by issuing shares to and collecting deposits from households. The household 
preference for liquidity determines the relative costs of banking finance through equity issuance and deposit 
mobilization. 
The rest of the paper has been structured as follows. Section 3 outlines the model followed by the presentation 
of calibration and simulation exercise in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
3. Model 
The model setup features standard elements in New Keynesian general equilibrium models augmented with 
financial frictions. The household sector makes consumption, labor supply and saving decisions. They use their 
savings to make deposits and/or buy shares in banks. Entrepreneurs rely on bank credit to purchase investment 
capital and combine it with hired worker to produce wholesale goods. The banks mobilize household resources in 
the form of deposits and equity and make loans to businesses/entrepreneurs.  
 
3.1. Entrepreneurs 
Every period the entrepreneur purchases the required capital stock which will be combined with labor to 
produce goods the next period. Thus, at time t entrepreneur j purchases homogenous capital for use at t+1, 
1
j
tK  . 
The return to capital is affected by both systemic risk and risk that is specific to the firm. The ex-post gross return 
on capital for firm j is 
1 1
j K
t tR   , where 1
j
t   is an idiosyncratic shock specific to firm j‘s return and 1
K
tR  is the ex 
post aggregate return to capital. The idiosyncratic disturbance ( )j  is independently and identically distributed 
both across entrepreneurs and over time, with a continuous and once-differentiable cumulative distribution 
function (c.d.f),  ( )F  , over a non-negative support, and with expected value equal to unity. 
Entrepreneur j enters next period with net worth 
1
j
tN   which complements borrowed funds for the purchase of
1
j
tK  . The borrowed money finances the difference between the total capital expenditure and own funds (net worth) 
and is equal to 
1 1 1
j j j
t t t tL QK N    , where tQ is the unit price of capital in period t. Each entrepreneur signs a 
credit contract with a bank which demands a required rate of return on lending between t and t+1, 
1
F
tR . This 
arrangement reflects an agency problem due to asymmetric information between the bank and the entrepreneur. 
This implies that only the borrower can without incurring costs observe the return of the project. The financial 
contract is designed to minimize the expected agency cost. As popularized by Bernanke et al. (1999) this gives rise 
to a costly state verification (CSV) problem, in which the lending bank must incur monitoring and supervision 
costs in order to know the actual performance of the borrower‘s project. We assume this monitoring cost is equal a 
fraction   of the realized gross return of the entrepreneur‘s capital: 
1 1 1,
j K j
t t t tR QK      
where 0 1  . Neither the bank nor the entrepreneur knows the idiosyncratic disturbance 
1
j
t   prior to the 
investment decision. That is both capital expenditure and the credit contract are established before the realization 
of the shock specific to the borrower. Once the investment project has been installed, the bank can observe the 
random shock but only after incurring monetary costs. 
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Given 
1
j
t tQK  , 1
j
tL  , and 1
K
tR , the optimal contract is characterized by a gross non-default loan rate , 1
j
tZ  , and 
a cut-off 
1
j
t  , such that, if 1 1
j j
t t   , the borrower pays the lender the amount 1 1 1
j K j
t t t tR QK     and keeps the 
residual value 
1 1 1 1( ) .
j j K j
t t t t tR QK      That is, 1
j
t   is defined by: 
                                                                        1 1 1 1
j K j j
t t t t t tR QK Z L                                                                  (1) 
If 
1 1
j j
t t   , the borrower receives nothing, while the bank monitors the borrower and receives
1 1 1(1 )
j K j
t t t tR QK     . 
In equilibrium, the contractual arrangement ensures that the lender gets an expected gross return on the loan 
equal to the required return: 
                          
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
(1 ( )]Z (1 ) ( ) ( ),
j
tj i j j K j F j j
t t t t t t t t t t tF L R QK f d R QK N

    

                                  (2a) 
where ( )f   is the probability density function (p.d.f) of  . 
Combining Equation (1) with Equation (2a) yields the following expression: 
                              
 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 10[1 ( )] (1 ) ( ) ( )
j
tj j j K j F j j
t t t t t t t t tF f d R K R QK N

     

                                       (2b) 
Expanding the expression within the parenthesis on the left hand side of Equation (2b) we can define the share 
of income going to the lender ( ( ) ) and the residual amount to the entrepreneur ( ( ) ):  
1 1
1 1 1 1
0 0
( ) ( )
[1 ( )] ( ) ( )
j j
t tj j j j
t t t tF f d f d
 
  
        
 
   
 
     
Thus the optimal financial contract involves maximizing the profit share of the entrepreneur subject to the 
lender resource constraint discussed previously: 
                                                                   1
1 1
1,
[1 ( )](1 R )(lev 1)
max
1
t t
K
t t t
t F
tlev
E
R



 

  

                                            (2c) 
s.t. 1 1 1
1
[ ( ) ( )](1 R )(1 lev )
1
K
t t t t
tF
t
lev
R
    

    


 
where 1 1
1
t t t
t
t
QK N
lev
N
 


 . 
Bernanke et al. (1999) have demonstrated that the lender‘s expected return is maximized at a unique interior 
point
1
j
t  , 
*
1
j
t  , and the equilibrium is characterized by 1
j
t   always being below 
*
1
j
t  . As a result, the possibility 
of equilibrium under credit rationing is not considered and the creditor‘s expected return is always increasing in
1
j
t  . 
Denoting the expected discounted return to capital by the ratio,  1
1
( )Kt t
F
t
E R
R


, if this ratio exceeds unity, the first 
order conditions of the contracting problem produces the following relationship between 1
1
j
t t
j
t
QK
N


 and the expected 
return to capital: 
                                                                         
1 1
1 1
( )j Kt t t t
j F
t t
QK E R
N R
 
 
 
 
 
,                                                          (3) 
where (.) 0   and (.) 0  . This implies that the entrepreneur incurs capital expenditures that are 
proportional to their net worth, with a proportionality factor that is positively correlated with the expected return 
to capital. Thus the probability of default should fall with a rise in the discounted return to capital. The decline in 
the specter of bankruptcy enables the firm to take on more loans and expand its operation. However, future default 
costs rise with the leverage ratio and this limits the ability of borrowers to expand investments indefinitely.  
Reformulating the preceding relationship in aggregated form (over firms) we get: 
                                                                       
1 1
1 1
( )
,
K
t t t t
F
t t
QK E R
N R
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            (4)    
where 1tK   represents the aggregate stock of capital bought by all entrepreneurial firms at time t, and  1tN   is their 
aggregate equity or net worth. 
                                                                    
1 1
1 1
( )
,
K
t t t t
F
t t
E R QK
R N
 
 
 
  
 
                                                                (5) 
where (.)  is increasing in 1
1
t t
t
QK
N


 for 1 1t t tN QK  . Consequently, in equilibrium, the expected discounted 
return to capital, 
1
1
( )Kt t
F
t
E R
R


, evolves inversely with the volume of capital expenditure financed by the firms‘ net 
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worth. 1
1
( )Kt t
F
t
E R
R


is what has been referred to as external finance premium in Bernanke et al. (1999) faced by 
entrepreneurs. 
 
3.1.1. Entrepreneurial Net Worth  
Entrepreneurs build their net worth based on accumulated retained earnings from past capital investments and 
wage compensation from supplying labor. As a technical requirement, we allow entrepreneurs to start with some 
net worth to begin their operations. Moreover, we assume that the fraction of the population who are 
entrepreneurs remains constant over time: in every period the number of firms entering the market is equal to the 
number of firms going out of the market. 
Let tV be the entrepreneurs‘ total net worth accumulated from business operations, then normalizing the 
entrepreneurial work hour to unity we have: 
1
e
t t tN V W                                                                                                                                                   (6) 
where e
tW  captures the wage income to entrepreneurs and   is the chance that the specific entrepreneur 
survives to the next period. To rule out the possibility that firms build sufficient net worth to be fully self financed, 
we assume that those firms are active for finite horizons.  
Note the equilibrium value of tV  can be cast as a function of the variables from the financial contract as: 
1 1 1( ) ( ) ,
K F K
t t t t t t t t t t tV R Q K R Q K N R Q K                                                                                               (7) 
where
1( )
K
t t t tR Q K    represent the total default monitoring costs and 0
( ) ( ) .
t j
t t f d

       Equations 
(6) and (7) indicate that the net worth of firms is influenced by their earnings net of interest expenses to the 
bankers. 
Entrepreneurs that exit from the market in period t are not allowed to purchase capital and simply consume 
their residual equity (1 ) tV : 
(1 )et tC V  ,                                                                                                                                                    (8) 
where e
tC  is the total consumption of entrepreneurs that exit from the market. 
 
3.2. Banks  
In our model economy, the financial industry is dominated by banks which function by mobilizing household 
funds and extending loans to entrepreneurial firms. In Bernanke et al. (1999) banks are only intermediaries and 
their operation is totally insulated from aggregate risk or whatever risk they face is diversified away. In our 
approach, for simplicity, lenders are exempt from exogenous reserve requirement, but must satisfy a risk-based 
capital requirement imposed by the regulatory regime. It is presumed that banks are the sole business entities that 
issue equity which rests on households‘ willingness and ability to hold capital in addition to deposits. The asset side 
of the bank balance sheet reveals not just loans to entrepreneurs, but also short term treasury securities. The debt 
instruments have zero weight in the risk-based capital assessment as they entail no risk (the fiscal sector is 
assumed not to default on its obligations). 
A special characteristic feature of banks concerns the facility necessary to monitor and supervise the activities 
of borrowers. Households—who are the major bank shareholders—lack this facility and delegate the responsibility 
of monitoring to banks, which grapple with the costly state verification problem described previously. Under such 
arrangements, each bank does not enjoy any bargaining advantage. In other words, the banks operate in a perfectly 
competitive environment and obtain zero profit in the long run as entry and exit are totally unregulated. 
The banks problem involves: 
 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
, , ,
max ( )
t t t t
F D S
t t t t t t t t t
S D B L
R L R B R D E R S
   
           
                                                 s.t. 1 1 1 1t t t tL B D S                                                                                        (9) 
                                                  
1
1
_t
t
S
del k
L


                                                                                                           (10) 
where 0 _ 1del k   is the exogenous capital adequacy ratio. Equations (9) and (10) specify the bank balance 
sheet constraint and the regulatory capital requirement, respectively. Moreover, 1 1 1 1, , ,andt t t tL B D S     denote, 
respectively, the loan advancement, purchase of treasury securities, deposit collection and equity issuance by banks 
between periods t and t+1; while 
1 1 1 1, , ,and
F D S
t t t t tR R R ER     represent the required gross real rate of return on 
loans; the gross real rate of return on treasury securities; the gross real rate of return on deposits; and the expected 
gross real rate of return on bank equity—in the same order. 
Notice that 
1
F
tR  differs from the non-default lending rate, 1tZ  . The difference arises from the possibility of 
entrepreneurs getting bankrupt--default on their loans—and the attendant monitoring costs which are reflected in 
1
F
tR . In addition, while the other rates of return are known in advance in period t, the rate of return on equity, 
1
S
t tER  , is uncertain and depends on the realization of the state of the economy at t+1. 
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Under binding bank capital requirement, 1
1
_t
t
S
del k
L


 , the first order conditions9 of the admissible solution 
of the bank‘s maximization problem are: 
                                                                 1 1
D
t tR R                                                                                      (11) 
                                                            1 1 1
(1 _ ) _ ( )F St t t tR del k R del kE R                                                  (12) 
These conditions illustrate that with binding minimum capital threshold, the required rate of return on lending 
is a weighted average of the rate of return on deposits and the expected rate of return on bank equity. Thus, we 
have significant departure from the Bernanke et al. (1999) framework where the required rate of return on lending 
equals the riskless/deposit rate. 
 
3.2.1. Return on Capital 
The exogenous regulatory capital requirement entails that the bank must maintain a level of equity which 
amounts to _del k  times the volume of total loan advancement. The supply of credit is therefore financed by a 
combination of bank equity and deposits mobilized from households, who allocate their savings between these 
financial instruments. The relative ease of using deposits for liquidity services and the riskless rate associated with 
them establishes a spread vis-à-vis the rate of return on bank capital, that is, 
1 1
S D
t t tER R  . 
Moreover, we assume that the real rate of return on physical and bank capital is the same: 
                                                                       1 1
S K
t t t tER ER                                                                          (13) 
The interpretation of (13) is that even if entrepreneurs are the only investors in physical capital, households 
would demand the same expected rate of return on both physical and bank capital if they were to make capital 
expenditures. Thus, Equation (13) represents a no-arbitrage condition as physical and bank capital provide no 
liquidity services and their returns are exposed to the same systemic risk. 
 
3.2.2. Capital Producers 
In this section we integrate the optimal financial contract signed in a partial equilibrium setting into New 
Keynesian general equilibrium framework. 
Capital producers buy final investment goods ti  from retailers and transform them using existing capital to 
generate new capital stock. Investment decisions are subject to quadratic adjustment costs. The inclusion of such 
costs induces volatility of entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital via the variability of the price of capital. We 
assume that capital producers deploy a linear technology and choose the level of investment spending to maximize 
profits subject to adjustment costs: 
                                                        
2
q,i
max
2
k t t
t t t t
t
I K
Q I I K
K
   
    
   
                                                  (14) 
where tQ  is the real price of capital while ,q ik and  are parameters capturing the degree of adjustment cost and 
depreciation of capital, respectively. The optimization problem gives rise to the following first order condition: 
                                                                         
.1
t
t q ik
t
I
Q
K
 
 
   
 
                                                             (15) 
Notice that the higher the value of ,q ik , the higher the volatility of the price of capital. Setting this parameter 
to zero entails a constant price of capital equal to unity.  
The law of motion for the aggregate capital stock in the economy is evolves according to:  
                                                                   1
(1 )t t tK I K                                                                          (16) 
 
3.3. Production by Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurial firms rely on bank loans to supplement their net worth in the purchase of capital goods. They 
combine the purchased capital with hired labor to produce wholesale goods which they sell at nominal marginal 
cost in perfectly competitive markets. Only households and entrepreneurs are employed by the firm as bankers are 
assumed to be insignificant fraction of the labor force. The firm uses constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas 
production technology: 
                                                                         
11[( ) ( ) ]k kh et t t t tY AK H H
                                                 (17) 
where 0 1k   is the capital share in aggregate output; 
1( ) ( )h et tH H
   is total labor  supply with h
tH  and 
e
tH indicating the work hours of households and entrepreneurs, respectively.  is the fraction of work hours 
provided by households. 
Finally, the demand for capital must satisfy the following condition for the expected return on capital:  
                                                          
, 1 1
1
(1 )k t tK
t t
t
MP Q
E R
Q
 

  
  
 
                                                            (18) 
3.4. Retailers 
Retailers are included to generate inertia in the price setting schedule. They are monopolistic firms that set 
their prices in a staggered fashion due to Calvo (1983). In each period, a random fraction 1   ( [0,1]  ) of firms 
                                                             
9 The complete set of first order conditions is available from the author upon request. 
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adjust their prices optimally. The remaining fraction,  , are assumed to follow an adjustment process that exploits 
indexation of current prices to inflation in the previous period: 
                                                                             
1
2
(j) P ( )I tt t t
t
P
P j
P




 
  
 
                                                      (19) 
Denoting the price level that the optimizing firm chooses in each period by
tP , the aggregate price level in the 
domestic economy evolves according to the pricing rule: 
                                                                   
1
1 1
1 1
1
2
(1 ) tt t t
t
P
P P P
P
 
 
 
 


    
     
     
                                      (20a) 
                                                                      Or 
2
1 1(1 )( )t t t tp p                                                     (20b) 
Those optimizing firms that are able to adjust their prices in the current period will choose 
tP  in such a way as 
to maximize the present discounted sum of future streams of profits subject to the sequence of demand constraints 
for household and residual government consumption: 
                                                               
     ,
0
max
t
j n
t j t j H t t j
P
j
Q Y P MC

  

                                             (21) 
Subject to  tt j t j t
t j
P
Y C G
P

 

 
   
 
 
where nt jMC  is the nominal marginal cost while 
j
t t jE  is the effective stochastic discount factor that considers 
the fact that firms have a 1    provability of  being able to reset their prices in each period.  
 
3.5. Households 
The economy is inhabited by an infinitely lived forward looking representative household. The household 
engages in key economic decisions that involve labor supply, consumption, and saving. The typical household has 
the opportunity to allocate its savings between riskless deposits ( tD ) and risky equity investment ( tS ) offered by 
banks, which offer expected returns of 
1
D
tR and 1
S
tR , respectively. The maximization problem of the typical 
household is: 
1 1
1 1 1
0, , ,
( )
max
1 1 1
t t t t
h
j t t t
jC N D S
C D H  

  
 
  


 
  
   
  
                                                       s.t.
1 1
h h D S
t t t t t t t t t t tC D S T W H R D R S                                    (22)
 
 
where    is the subjective discount rate,   is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (same for both 
consumption and deposit demand),   is the inverse elasticity of labor supply; htH  captures the number of hours 
worked, h
tW  is the hourly household real wage rate, tT  is tax expense, t  is the dividend receipts, tC denotes the 
real composite consumption index of  home produced goods and services. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Calibration 
The quarterly business bankruptcy rate is set to 0.0075 based on the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) survey results which report an annual 3 per cent business discontinuance rate for Ethiopia. The 
loan monitoring cost is fixed at 0.12 as in Bernanke et al. (1999). The fraction of entrepreneurs who survive to the 
next period is assumed to be 97 percent. These values suggest a steady state leverage ratio of 1.932, an annual 
external finance premium of 200 basis points, and an elasticity of external finance premium to leverage ratio of 
0.041. Based on these values and choosing a value of 1.01 for the quarterly gross risk-free rate, we get a quarterly 
gross return on capital equal to 1.0157 and a quarterly gross bank financing cost of 1.0107. See Appendix A for the 
complete list of parameters and their definition. 
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4.2. Simulation Results 
 
 
Figure-1. Impulse Response to Monetary Policy Shock with Financial Frictions (solid line) and without Financial Frictions 
(dotted line)  
Source: (Author‘s own simulation results) 
 
Figure 1 shows the relative responses of selected endogenous variables to a one-off quarterly monetary policy 
shock equal to 0.05 standard deviation applied under money growth rule. It is clear that the results are significantly 
different for the two models. In the model with financial distortions, unexpected increase in the policy rate lifts the 
cost of raising fresh capital for financial intermediaries which they translate into higher external premium for loan 
applicants. By contrast, when the role of frictions is switched off, there is no difference among the policy rate, the 
required rate of return on bank loans, and the rate of return on equity investment. This is summarized by the flat 
impulse response of the external finance premium. Consistent with conventional empirical evidence, monetary 
tightening is accompanied by a decline in inflation, output, consumption, investment, and asset prices. But the 
degree of contraction is deeper and more persistent in the model where supply and demand side financial market 
imperfections have been considered. These results are broadly in line with previous findings that include Markovic 
(2006); Aguiar and Drumond (2007) and Zhang (2009) that found unanticipated monetary shocks are amplified and 
propagated much more strongly with double agency cost problems in the financial markets.  
 
 
Figure-2. Impulse Responses of Output and Inflation under Interest Rate (dotted) and Money Growth (solid) Rules (Source: 
Author‘s own simulation results) 
Source: (Author‘s own simulation results) 
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The next task is to see if previous findings under Taylor based rules could be quantitatively any different from 
those under money growth rule. Figure 2 presents the responses of output and inflation to shocks under alternative 
monetary policy regimes. The qualitative aspects of the results are more or less preserved. For instance, monetary 
policy tightening (a rise in the policy rate or a fall in money supply) leads to noticeable reduction in output and 
inflation while improvement in factor productivity boosts production and eases upward pressure on price changes. 
Increased fiscal intervention also expands output under both monetary policy rules. However, the effects of a rise in 
public expenditure on inflation clearly depend on the operational instrument deployed by the central bank. When 
the monetary authority sticks to an interest rate rule, increased government borrowing feeds into higher inflation. 
But under money growth rule expanded fiscal activism results in a decline in inflation in the first few quarters. To 
the extent that the output effect of a fiscal stimulus is more persistent, the money growth rule contributes to a fall 
in price changes in the immediate short run perhaps reflecting delayed effects of fiscal policy due to, say, the low 
velocity of money in developing economies such as Ethiopia. Over all, the model with money growth rule generates 
qualitatively similar results as those which employ interest rate rules (Markovic, 2006; Aguiar and Drumond, 2007; 
Zhang, 2009). 
 
4.3. Sensitivity Check 
A common challenge when using DSGE models is the so called ―parameter bifurcation problem‖—the 
observation that changing parameter values a little leads to considerable change in the impulse response of 
endogenous variables. It is impractical to verify the sensitivity of these responses to changes in the value of every 
parameter. However, given the objective this paper, I tried to evaluate how sensitive the results are to variations in 
the values of policy parameters in the central bank money growth reaction function rule. The impulse response 
functions were generally stable both qualitatively and quantitatively to such small changes in the values of the 
parameters in the monetary  policy rule. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In the last few years, macroeconomic modeling has emphasized the role of credit market frictions in magnifying 
and transmitting nominal and real disturbances and their implication for macro-prudential policy design. In this 
chapter, we construct a medium-size small New Keynesian general equilibrium model with active banking sector. 
In this set-up, the financial sector interacts with the real side of the economy via firm balance sheet and bank 
capital conditions and their impact on investment and production decisions. We rely on the financial accelerator 
mechanism due to Bernanke et al. (1999) and combine it with a bank capital channel as demonstrated by Aguiar and 
Drumond (2007). We calibrate the resulting model from the perspective of a low income economy reflecting the 
existence of relatively high investment adjustment cost, strong fiscal dominance, and underdeveloped financial and 
capital markets where the central bank uses money growth in stabilizing the national economy.  
The findings are broadly consistent with previous studies that demonstrated stronger role for credit market 
imperfections in amplifying and propagating monetary policy shocks. While most studies assume an interest 
feedback rule to capture the behavior of monetary authorities, we rely on a money growth rule to adapt to the 
dominant policy practice in low income economies. It is interesting that in our model the interaction of corporate 
and bank balance sheets generates similar results as those which employ interest rate rules (Markovic, 2006; 
Zhang, 2009; Agur, 2010) for instance). 
The policy implication of this result is particularly relevant in low income countries where small and fragile 
firms face very high external finance premium. With little or no net worth to post as collateral, these firms often 
have to pay above market rates on small loans obtained from banks and microfinance institutions. Even though 
adding a default premium on poor borrowers makes perfect financial sense, it creates a kind of self-fulfilling 
prophesy where the higher lending rate undermines the ability of the poor borrower to start and operate profitable 
projects. A clear market failure is present in the loan market for poor households, which justifies well-designed and 
targeted intervention that facilitates the creation and provision of special loans to struggling businesses. The world 
has long recognized the importance of arranging concessional loans at lower rates and with grace periods for poor 
countries. And poor countries eligible for such programs have made effective use of this arrangement in reducing 
poverty and creating employment for their citizens. A similar logic should apply at the micro level to rectify credit 
market failures for the penniless. 
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Appendix  
 
Appendix-A. Parameter definitions and values 
Parameter  Description  Value  
β Subjective discount factor 0.98  
    Central bank weight attached to inflation gap 1  
    Central bank weight attached to output  0.11  
i  
Interest semi-elasticity  0.0035  
θ Calvo price rigidity  0.75  
   Money growth rate smoothening/persistence 0.8  
AR Coefficient for each exogenous process 0.8  
1/σ Inverse elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1/3  
φ Inverse elasticity of labor supply 4  
v Elasticity of external premium with respect to leverage 0.041  
,q ik  Sensitivity of price ofcapital to the investment-capital ratio 0.5  
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025  
   Steady state gross return on entrepreneurial project 1.0157  
   Steady state cost of raising funds by lender  1.0107  
r Steady state deposit/riskless rate 1.01  
K/N Steady State leverage ratio 1.932  
Y/N Steady State output net worth ratio 0.2383  
MP_K Steady state marginal product of capital 0.0407  
Del_K Exogenous capital requirement ratio 0.12  
C/D Steady state consumption-deposit ratio  0.22  
  Capital share in production 0.3  
(1 )   Fraction of labor supplied by households 0.693  
(1 )(1 )   Fraction of labor supplied by entrepreneurs 0.007  
MC Steady state gross cost mark up 1.1  
μ Loan monitoring cost 0.12  
γ Business survival rate 0.97  
  Steady state profit division parameter 0.4805  
( )F   Quarterly business bankruptcy rate 0.0075  
I/Y Steady State ratio of Investment to GDP 0.18  
C/Y Steady State ratio of Consumption to GDP 0.60  
G/Y Steady State ratio of Public spending to GDP 0.22  
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